Dear All,
I was the responsible officer when the alarm settings for 30-day electronic refrigerator temperature logger were decided. I will explain the hows and whys behind this decision. I will also touch upon the confusion I see in the messages between the alarm and the stability. Lastly, I would elaborate on alarm philosophy as a control measure from risk management perspective.
Why to abandon thermometers?
Until the revolutionary introduction of 30-day electronic refrigerator temperature loggers, temperature monitoring in refrigerators was done with the help of thermometers. We perfectly know that thermometer is NOT a monitoring device; it is only good when you look at it. Oxford dictionary defines monitor as follows:
“A device used for observing, checking, or keeping a continuous record of something.”
That means monitoring includes an action that is to pay continued close attention to [something] for a particular purpose. Here ‘continuity’ is the key, and thermometer has no continuity. If you see say 4.5 deg C reading in a thermometer in a health centre refrigerator on Monday morning, it does not mean that things were okay during the weekend. In this sense, readings within the recommended temperature range give a ‘false’ confidence to workers as if things were in control. Although it would not tell you any other details, reading say -2 deg C means something and has some value – meaning that something is wrong at that particular moment. Unfortunately, there are still many immunization and other medicine programmes that use thermometers as the main monitoring devices in unit level refrigerators. If you were hospitalized with a heart problem, would you be happy to be connected to a “thermometer like” heart monitor that does not record and nurses and doctors only check it in the morning and in the evening?
Temperature alarm settings for refrigerators (applicable to 30-day electronic refrigerator temperature logger)
From this perspective, we wanted to eliminate thermometers from the programme as monitoring devices. It was an IQPC cold chain meeting, during a lunch I talked to representatives of temperature monitoring device manufacturers and told them about the dream device I had in my mind – describing the features you are familiar with today. Though there was a general agreement that this could be done, nobody promised anything. And just before the Xmas period of that year, the representative of one of the temperature monitoring device companies visited me with a prototype device saying that I can hang it my Xmas tree… The following year we have finalized the specifications and verification protocol following relevant PQS SOPs and prequalified the very first device.
There were a lot of deliberations in-house and outside the WHO on how to set up the alarms. We believed that the alarm should be based on refrigerator performance criteria (please note that this performance criteria for the refrigerator is also established taking into account the excursions not have an impact on the most heat and freeze sensitive vaccine). In this regard, the specifications and verification protocols that are used for refrigerators were taken as the basis for this decision. Because the logic was if we allow a certain amount of excursion in prequalifying refrigerators, we cannot set up a limit that is tighter.
Acceptable temperature range for refrigerators is described in the PQS specifications as follows:
“The acceptable temperature range for storing vaccine is +2°C to +8°C. However, transient excursions outside this range will be tolerated, within the following limits:
- No excursion must exceed +20°C.
- No excursion must reach 0°C.
- The cumulative effect of any excursions within the above range will be assessed over the five day period of the day/night test. For this test, the calculated mean kinetic temperature (MKT) must remain within the range +2°C to +8°C when the default activation energy is set at 83,144 kJ per mol. using the recorded temperature data, an MKT figure will be calculated for each sensor. The worst-case result will determine the outcome of the test. Excursions in other tests will be noted and must not exceed the defined upper and lower limits.”
These figures were worked out for the repeated cycles of the day/night test that is equivalent to 30 days (with the assumption that vaccines in such refrigerators are used within a month) that such excursion does not have any significant life lost in the most heat sensitive vaccines.
Based on these calculations, we agreed to have the lower limit set to -0.5 deg C for 1 hour single event. This is an “operational” point rather than being an “actual” freezing point for the most freeze-sensitive vaccine that is HepB. Freezing is a very complex process and cannot only be explained with the help of temperature. For example, in our validation of the shake test study (2010), published in World Health Bulletin (http://kartoglu.ch/papers/11_Validation_of_shake%20test_for_detecting_freeze_damage_to_adsorbed_vaccines.pdf), we have exposed all freeze-sensitive vaccines to -2 deg C for 24 hours, and no freezing was observed in any of them at the end of this period. Microscopic examination of these vials was identical to those kept at 2-8 deg C. This was confirmed with phase contrast microscopy (PCM), scanning electron microscopy (SEM) as well as atomic force microscopy (AFM) that the lattice between the antigen and aluminum adjuvant was intact and not broken in these vaccines. Since freezing points of freeze-sensitive vaccines have pretty big range, the programme had to have an “operational” point for freezing, taking the most freeze-sensitive vaccine HepB freezing point as the trigger point. But here we should note that HepB having -0.5 deg C freezing point does not mean it will freeze when it is exposed to this temperature, exactly like water does not necessarily freeze at zero degree… In this regard, we need to distinguish between “being actually frozen” and “being exposed to freezing temperatures”. So, with the lower alarm, we are warned that the refrigerator had “freezing temperatures” that might put freeze-sensitive vaccines at risk if not fixed.
Many commercial freeze-indicators have zero degree as the trigger point. However, taking account the accuracy of temperature monitoring devices (+/- 0.5 deg C), we know that half of the alarm cases will be above zero degree at the positive temperature side. With the Gaussian distribution logic, setting the trigger point to -0.5 deg C, we manage to have all alarm cases below zero degree C.
As for the higher temperatures, in addition to 5-day day/night test we have taken into account the hold-over time that is defined as “The time in hours during which all points in the vaccine compartment remain between +2°C and +10°C, at the maximum ambient temperature of the temperature zone for which the appliance is rated, after the power supply has been disconnected.” This is how the 10 hours single excursion event above 8 deg C came up.
Alarm and vaccine stability
I see that there is an effort in correlating the stability of the vaccine with the refrigerator alarms. I believe this is the whole argument. In reality, the alarms are intended to monitor the refrigerators, not the contents of the refrigerators. These alarms (and their frequency) tell you whether or not a refrigerator is operating appropriately. Any PQS prequalified fridge should stay within the alarm limits most of the time (an occasional alarm could occur if an external stimulus was applied).
Some contributors on the discussion thread seem to be making an argument that boils down to this “10 hours above 8 deg C will cause false alarms and the alarms should only go off when an excursion is severe enough to significantly reduce a vaccine’s remaining life, therefore we need to investigate for better alarms”. While I do agree that false alarms are very problematic, I don’t agree with this argument that any form of the 10 hours over 8 deg C alarm could be considered as false. Because alarms are set to reflect problems (hazardous situations) in refrigerator performance before they could cause harm to its contents. The alarm should, in principle, be set in a way to serve as a warning so control measures could be taken to bring back the performance of the refrigerator to the optimum level. By doing (fixing) this, you prevent the hazardous situation harming the content. It is not possible to correlate the problem directly with the stability of the vaccines since the hazardous situation is occurring at the last mile, where all products have already been travelled in the supply chain prior reaching to this particular refrigerator and most likely experienced various other excursions. Even you have full access of the detailed raw data from the device; you cannot reach certain conclusions regarding remaining shelf life of the products since you don’t have detailed data on the temperature storage conditions of each product prior to being placed into the current refrigerator. In this regard, vaccine vial monitor (VVM) is the only tool that can be instrumental in telling us what has happened to that particular vial before [from the high-temperature exposure perspective].
If you are running a study, following the product along the supply chain, you then perfectly correlate the temperature exposure data with the vaccine stability. But this has nothing to do with refrigerator alarms. A good example of such approach can be reviewed in recently published manuscript on following oxytocin from the manufacturer (Germany) to the service points in Ghana (http://kartoglu.ch/papers/00_stability_of_oxytocin_GHANA.pdf).
Suggesting a spectrodensitometer to be used to evaluate VVM is out of proportions of the field reality. First of all, such devices are used for “validation” purposes, mainly by the VVM manufacturer for quality and release purposes and by vaccine manufacturers when they receive orders. They need regular calibration. In addition, you cannot use spectrodensitometer to read VVMs on the vials. VVMs must be removed from the vials and put to flat surfaces to be read. Even you do this, at the end, your decision will only be “use” or “don’t use”. Who needs optical density values of reference ring and active surface of the VVM at the health centre level? Not mentioning the cost of the densitometer, I consider this suggestion as not realistic, impractical and technically inappropriate.
To summarize, the fridge alarms are for alerting users to offending fridges, the VVM is for monitoring cumulative heat on vaccine life.
Alarm philosophy and quality risk management perspective
The word “alarm” comes from Italian all'arm, meaning "to the arms", "to the weapons", telling armed men to pick up their weapons and get ready for action, because an enemy may have suddenly appeared. Alarm is a signal about a problem or condition, and requires an “action”. The action that is required in the original word in Italian is “picking up the weapons”.
In this regard, we do not support 2 and 8 deg C instant alarms for health centre and pharmacy type service provider refrigerators. Let me explain this with an analogy. If you want to get up at 6 am, what time do you set up your alarm clock? Would you ever set your alarm to 4 am? Because you are not going to wake up and get up at that hour, and there is no point of waking up and re-setting the alarm to 6 am at that time. If you think of other alarms you are familiar with in everyday life, do you know any alarm that there is no any action you should take? Think of a fire alarm, smoke alarm, low tire pressure [for cars] alarm, engine alarm, burglar alarm…
So, my point here is that what are the things you should do (your DO-LIST) when you have an instant alarm of 8 deg C in a health centre refrigerator? If you cannot come up with a DO-LIST, your alarm is not set appropriately. Similarly, there is not much you can do when you have an alarm of immediate 2 deg C. In our case, if you have an alarm of >8 deg C for 10 hours, this can only happen under certain conditions (external stimulus): Someone left the fridge door open (or the door is broken), someone played with the thermostat to a wrong direction, serious power cut for more than 24 hours, or someone loaded big amount of (warm) thermal mass inside (new shipment). So, your do-list could start with “check whether there is electricity”, and then “check the power cable whether it is connected properly”, and so on… If someone can give me a do-list for 8.1 deg C alarm, I would be delighted to learn. As for the cumulative heat exposure of the products, you may refer to the VVM readings and take appropriate actions.
As for the low alarm of -0.5 deg C, in addition to checking the thermostat position, the environment being extremely cold, you can conduct shake test to decide what to do with your freeze-sensitive vaccines. Here you have a do-list. Can you come up with a do-list for 1.9 deg C alarm for a health centre refrigerator?
I am sure some of you would remember the study in Albania to evaluate the value of SMS-enabled alarm systems at different levels of the cold chain. I do not want to get in details of this study, but when selecting a type of control measure, we need to think about implications. We cannot ask or introduce a technology for control because it is modern or top of the list. For me there is one simple question that needs to be answered here: “If there is an SMS alarm that you receive 3 am in your bed, whatever you would do, does it need to be done at that particular time or would there be any difference if you attend it in the morning when you reach the facility?” If what needs to be done is not something that must be done immediately upon receiving the alarm, then I do not see any reason to receive an SMS in the middle of the night.
From the risk management perspective, temperature monitoring devices are control measures for “detection”. They detect the predefined hazardous situation and alert workers with various types of alarm. Once we define the hazardous situation, we can think about the likelihood and the severity issues to calculate the risk score of the event. If the risk score falls in the red or amber category, we will have to do something and come up with control measures. We may not be able to eliminate hazards nor substitute them in all cases, but we may uncouple a process or reduce the number of steps or risk exposures that could occur. We may isolate the hazard so it presents fewer potential risks. We may also change conditions. More importantly, we may decrease the frequency of an event happening as well as decreasing the consequences should an event occur. In this sense, we can come up with redundant controls (like in the Swiss-cheese model) against each and every hazard. For example, PQS decision of having a sealed thermostat (preventive control measure) is to eliminate wrong thermostat setting (hazard). This control measure reduces the likelihood of temperature excursion events. Placing vaccines in groups based on their stability on different shelves is also a control measure. Shake test is a mitigation nature control measure and is used only once the hazard [exposure to freezing temperature] occurs. Shake test would also serve as a preventive control measure if you detect damage and discard vials [so, children do not receive this ineffective vaccine]. VVM is also a very good example of a control measure for both detection [the problem] and prevention [administrating heat damaged vaccine, vaccine wastage].
Warm regards,
UMIT
camp Jakarta